Friday, January 23, 2015

The Death of Political Parties in Sudan?

Part 1 

New Year’s Day saw the 59th anniversary of Sudan’s independence from the British.  With an unsurprising surge of nationalism Sudanese state-run television played back to back video clips of the footage of the Independence Day ceremony from 1956.   


Those black and white images of the Sudanese flag being raised at the presidential palace in the presence of the Governor General Alexander Knox-Helm, Al-Azhari (head of what would later become the Democratic Unionist Party) and the opposition leader Mohammed Ahmed Al-Mahjoub (Umma Party) is one that was free from the overshadowing presence of any one party. This is in deep contrast to the Sudan of today which seems unable to allow for celebrations amongst a similarly varied audience from among Sudan’s present-day political parties. 

One of the starkest differences is the relative secularity of Sudanese politics at a time when Muslim Brotherhood-style parties were confined to the Arkan Nighash (Speaker’s Corners) of Khartoum University compared to the present Islamised political landscape. Furthermore over time we seem to have lost the ability to distinguish between political parties. The number of parties has certainly grown exponentially; if the national dialogue 7+7 mechanism is anything to go by, there are at least 14 individually named parties in Sudan, each vying for a slice of the ever-shrinking political cake. However the influence of most of them, even combined, has waned drastically.   

These erstwhile strong opposition parties, once considered prodigal sons are now in their modern-day incarnations are perhaps misguided by those who would more accurately be described as cultists. These parties’ ranks formerly filled with a myriad of people who would gain status, a potential to rise in the ranks or simply as sense of belonging have through successive internal and national developments been degraded. Many Sudanese now seem to eschew political association, even privately. The largest of these opposition parties the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Umma Party (NUP), the Popular Congress Party (PCP) and the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) have steadily concentrated decision-making power into the hands of the few with some taking up increasingly patrilineal structures of leadership.  This has led to in-fighting, fragmentation, apathy from support bases and funding issues. As the world becomes less centralised these parties have critically also failed to grasp the imagination and support of the Sudanese people in the 21st century. 

Sectarian allegiances

Initially sectarian allegiances formed the lynchpin of support that some of the more traditional parties have enjoyed with the Umma Party drawing support from the Ansar or followers of the Mahdi (largely from Darfur, Kordofan or the Mahdi’s familial home of Dongola) and the DUP’s initial, and to some extent remaining, ties with the Khatmiyya sect, one of the largest sects in Sudan. However with the increasing correlation between NCP allegiance and economic opportunity, even sectarian ties within families have gradually been undermined. On a deeper level, the NCP carries with it not just a political ideology but also a religions perspective allegiance to the party has the potential to diminish even long-held familial sectarian beliefs. 

On the face of it the 2010 election results show very few votes cast in favour of these traditional sectarian parties; DUP (1.93%) and the Umma Party (0.96%).  However, t it is worth considering that potential large swathes of people would have heeded the call to boycott the elections all together accounting for the poor results.  This shows that the these political parties may well still yield considerable influence over their retained supporters; but quite how many of those remain and which demographics they represent is uncertain. It is also possible that general apathy resulting from decades of one party rule has played a large part in dissuading voters. 

The NCP and the Islamic Front which preceded it have largely replicated the initial idea of the Umma and the DUP, with Hassan al-Turabi as its supreme leader, insofar as a religious-based organisation could supersede traditional or ethnic ties and be more nationally relevant. While the NCP has learned from its counterparts the reverse is hardly true. Most of the larger parties have fragmented into opposing factions, while the NCP has largely been able to co-opt its break-away factions. Unable to question party leadership and betray any claim of democratic processes within the opposition parties, some instead have splintered into as many as four factions leaving supporters in the polity at a loss as to which to support.  

Loss of faith 

Even without the confusion of multi-faction parties, it is uncertain whether people can tell the major parties apart, particularly when long-standing, respected parties such as the DUP are seen to join forces with the government and undermine their secular ideology and alienate lifelong supporters. With the sons of both al-Sadig al-Mahdi (leader of the Umma party) and self-exiled Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani (leader of the DUP) joining the presidential entourage as assistants to Omer al-Bashir, hope of a reversion to distinctive politics under future leadership were quashed.  These appointments have come despite the arrest of party leaders, including most recently al-Mahdi himself and seemingly ad hoc moves by the government that ‘opposition’ parties see as degrading to the political process.  These include the recently added 14 amendments to, most problematically, an interim constitution which effectively increase the president’s powers.

2015’s Independence Day celebration was rather thin on multi-party representations. But not too long ago Independence Day celebrations at the palace saw Al-Mahdi and al-Mirghani decorated with the first class order of the republic. This is something that could hardly be entertained during the period of initial resistance to the coup d’état of 1989.  The tacit approval of 2005’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 has cast the NCP as Sudan’s only legitimate political party and has disempowered the ‘opposition’ parties, casting them at best as supporting acts rather than genuine political counterparts. 

After the coup d’état of 1989, when the opposition parties united under the banner of the National Democratic Alliance, political parties were able – at least in spirit – to provide credible resistance as per the NDA ethos. It was the first time this resistance was tested.  Due to recent tensions, exacerbated particularly by the continuing issues surrounding the beleaguered national dialogue process, a new national alliance of opposition groups was formed.  This time however with the backdrop of previous dealings with the government and the incredible loss of credibility of opposition parties, the National Consensus Forces alliance inspires less hope.  

Elections in April then seem to be a foregone conclusion. Even under free and fair elections it is possible that the NCP would be voted into power again.  Against the background of perceived weakness of opposition parties, the NCP has been able to capitalise on what many see as the hypocrisy of the ICC (and by extension the international community) against Omer al-Bashir and therefore, goes the narrative, against Sudan.  It has also been able to corner the market on jobs and opportunities increasing rather than increasing its support – regardless of how nominal it may be. 

This chronic waning of faith in the formal opposition and the boycott of the 2010 elections by the majority of the largest political parties precipitated a stark reaction from particularly Sudanese activists.  The group Girifna (Arabic for ‘We are fed up’ or more accurately ‘We are disgusted’) paved the way for public dissent leading to an increase in articles, online blogs and politically-motivated social networking and ultimately exposing the erosion of the political structure.   With armed groups still fighting in the peripheries, these developments will have also increased support for these movements and have weakened the narrative that armed rebellion works counter to the national interest.  This has no doubt played a part in the coming together of both opposition and armed groups under the National Consensus Forces.

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